Tensions in the Taiwan Strait remain elevated as China continues to apply sustained “grey zone” pressure against Taiwan. These operations, which include large-scale military drills, air and naval incursions, missile exercises and coast guard patrols, are designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict. While commercial shipping has not been directly targeted, the operational environment is becoming increasingly complex.

Since 2022, China has normalised frequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activity around Taiwan. Joint air-sea exercises often simulate blockades or encirclement manoeuvres.

Hybrid threats are redefining the vulnerability of European land-based logistics by exploiting their interconnected, dual-use nature below the threshold of open conflict, as even small-scale, ambiguous acts of disruption can produce disproportionate operational and psychological effects.

This piece aims to shed light on how and why this evolution materialises, and to highlight that resilience, rapid recovery, and integrated coordination are vital for continuity in today’s landscape.

Although very common in maritime trade, bulk carriers are particularly vulnerable during crises, as demonstrated by attacks in the Black Sea and the Red Sea. Their slowness, poor manoeuvrability and long stopover times make them more vulnerable to strikes, hijackings or pirate attacks.

Although they are not major symbolic targets, unlike oil tankers or container ships, they remain popular for drug trafficking thanks to their many possible hiding places and the variety of ports they can serve.

It was previously assumed that 2024 would not see any developments to end the war in Ukraine and 2025 proved similar. Although there were continued varying degrees of intensity in terms of incidents in the Black Sea, the statistics on maritime related incidents indicate that 2025 was largely similar to 2024.

The political and diplomatic efforts made to establish a viable peace or ceasefire during 2025 did not bring about any tangible change to the overall situation.

In late November and early December 2025, Ukraine successfully struck Russian vessels in the Black Sea, presenting Moscow with a strategic dilemma. While re-targeting Ukrainian ports remains an option, Russia has so far avoided committing significant energy to such operations.

Instead, the Kremlin continues its established strategy of targeting Ukraine’s critical energy, transport, and heating infrastructure, aiming to make the winter months as difficult as possible for the civilian population.

Europe’s clean energy transition and defence modernisation rely on secure maritime access to critical minerals, over 80% of which are traded by sea. Yet, Europe remains dependent on Chinese refining and is increasingly exposed to Beijing’s expanding overseas maritime footprint, including stakes in key dual-use port infrastructure and logistics networks.

Chinese-linked facilities along major logistic hubs potentially facilitate enhanced visibility of, and leverage over, global mineral flows.

The recent surge in vessel boardings on the Singapore Strait prompted arrests and enhanced patrols by the Indonesian Marine Police.

Batam gangs remain active, diversifying into smuggling, while socioeconomic pressures continue to shape maritime crime trends.

Ahmed Al Sharaa must contend with domestic challenges to his rule, as he seeks to legitimise the power he acquired as leader of the Hayat Tahrir el Sham (HTS) and consolidate his grip on Syria.

A first challenge is that the HTS, now officially subsumed into the new Syrian Ministry of Defence, remains a coalition of militias with divergent orientations.

Balochistan’s strategic and economic importance has drawn both US and Chinese interest, particularly in its mineral and port sectors.

However, the province’s volatile security landscape poses significant risks to foreign projects while the potential for great-power competition over critical resources threatens broader regional stability.

Hybrid attacks are increasingly targeting supply chains to disrupt national stability and economic resilience. By exploiting vulnerabilities in transport, logistics, and warehousing, adversaries can inflict widespread disruption and blur the line between crime and state-sponsored sabotage.

As recent incidents in Europe show, cargo crime can be a new and effective modus operandi that adversary states can employ to achieve their goals.

In 2025, US trade policy continues to be one of the most disruptive influences on Asian commerce. Washington has imposed tariffs on a wide range of goods from China, particularly steel, solar panels, semiconductors, and batteries, while extending scrutiny to imports from Vietnam, Malaysia, and India.

The US argues that these measures protect domestic industries and national security. However, for Asian exporters, they increase costs, add uncertainty, and erode competitiveness.

In post-Assad Syria, the government is facing challenges to rebuild the country and its economy. Years of conflict and civil war have created a structural energy deficit. The Syrian population has been experiencing massive electricity and fuel shortages.

While the country has historically been a major producer and exporter of oil and gas, it is nowadays unable to resume the levels of activity that the industry saw prior to 2011. The infrastructure is in shambles and the continuing political tensions between the different factions are delaying the efforts to reinvigorate the energy sector.

Cargo crime remains a persistent but often underreported threat, with fragmented data obscuring its real impact on supply chain operations. Misleading statistics and inconsistent reporting may create a distorted view of risk, resulting in misaligned policies and misplaced resources.

This piece argues that the solution is not simply to gather more data at any cost, but to focus on obtaining better data: grounded, contextual, and fit to support meaningful decisions.

The recent attacks in August, against Ukrainian port infrastructure at Chornomorsk and Izmail, do not in of themselves indicate a significant change in the threat picture to commercial maritime operations in the Black Sea.

Both Chornomorsk and Izmail have been targeted by Russian attacks before and therefore the recent attacks do not constitute any new scenario in relation to merchant shipping. The attacks emphasise the ongoing threats concerning the ports.

Unmanned technologies are increasingly shaping modern warfare, with most international observers putting considerable attention on modern conflict zones.

In Latin America, criminal groups continue to adopt unmanned technologies in increasingly sophisticated ways, despite financial constraints, that challenge state authority and regional stability.

The geopolitical context continues to have direct and indirect effects on maritime operations. Several ships bound for Israel have experienced disruptions to their operations. The cruise industry has not been spared, as demonstrated by the protests surrounding the cruise ship CROWN IRIS in July.

With ceasefire negotiations remaining deadlocked, it is likely that there will be an increase in activist activity that could negatively impact port operations and the cruise industry.

In today’s world we are returning to an international environment where hybrid threats and strategic competition are no longer historic or theoretical—they are shaping the threat landscape in real time.

Offshore infrastructure, particularly wind farms and subsea cables, is increasingly exposed to a new class of threat: persistent, multi-domain, and deliberately ambiguous. As geopolitical friction intensifies—especially in maritime zones where NATO and Russian interests intersect—traditional security models are falling short.

For 12 days from 13 to 24 June, Israel and Iran traded ammunition with the US joining in at the last moment to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran’s feeble retaliation did not include the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, long viewed as its “ultimate option”.

Vessels in the Gulf of Oman did adopt a holding pattern, with many hesitating to cross the Strait, but that was mostly for fear of collateral damage and navigational hazards. Did Iran lose a game of chicken with the US in threatening to close the Strait, did broader considerations prevent Iran from taking action, or was the threat to the Iranian regime not grave enough to justify the use of its last resort?