Recent trends within the online community of ‘ship spotters’ show increased focus on monitoring Russian shadow fleet activities essentially as a form of activism.

If this trend of ‘activist intelligence’, or what we may call ‘ACTIVINT’, continues or spreads beyond this niche, it could potentially have implications on both maritime intelligence and the field of open-source intelligence.

Maritime hybrid threats may increasingly depend less on shadow fleet vessels than on the recruitment, coercion, and exploitation of seafarers and port workers across the global maritime ecosystem.

As state-linked actors adopt methods resembling “crime-as-a-service”, ordinary commercial vessels and personnel could provide access for intelligence collection, influence operations, and disruptive activity - creating a challenge that extends far beyond vessel ownership and sanctions evasion.

The discovery of cocaine concealed by smugglers in vessels’ sea chests, while common on American and European routes, had been absent in Southeast Asia for decades.

Beginning in late 2025, that changed, as traffickers tested new methods, representing a significant shift for the region.

The spate of attacks in the southern Red Sea is linked to the growing popularity of some southern leaders and Houthi concerns that a tribal coalition may be mounted against them.

Following the expulsion of the UAE from Yemen and the dismantling of its proxy, the “Southern Transitional Council”, southern Yemeni factions, along with a large swath of population have looked to Tarik Saleh as a potential new Southern Yemeni leader.

Europe's Military Mobility initiatives are designed to improve the movement of personnel, equipment, and goods across strategic transport corridors. However, while investments often focus on roads, railways, and border infrastructure, a longstanding shortage of secure truck parking continues to expose drivers and cargo to criminal activity.

As transport networks become increasingly important to both economic resilience and strategic mobility, the role of secure parking deserves greater attention.

The article explores why narcotics smuggling—particularly cocaine trafficking—remains highly relevant to commercial shipping despite the expansion of maritime security priorities.

It highlights how rising cocaine production, increasingly sophisticated concealment methods, and adaptable criminal networks are generating greater operational, legal, and security risks for vessels, crews, and global supply chains.

Ukraine’s war with Russia has entered a more dynamic phase in 2026, driven by expanded drone production, longer-range capabilities and multi-target operations.

Kyiv’s recent attacks in the Sea of Azov underline its growing operational reach, while both sides continue widening existing capabilities without necessarily escalating the conflict beyond the region.

This piece is a short reflection on whether Europe's approach to governing its transport corridors matches the ambition of its transport corridor strategy.

The EU's updated FDI screening framework provides a timely prompt: if foreign influence over logistics infrastructure can accumulate through many instruments—equity ownership, state loans, construction contracts, warehousing, data platforms, etc.—and across multiple jurisdictions at once, are existing frameworks asking the right questions at the right level?

Iran is seeking to impose a transit fee in the Strait of Hormuz, thereby challenging the principle of freedom of navigation, against the backdrop of a war launched on 28 February 2026 by the US and Israel.

Taking advantage of deadlocks in negotiations, Tehran is adopting a delaying tactic based on maximalist demands to consolidate de facto control of the strait and legitimize a toll system.

The Baltic Sea has undergone a marked transformation during 2025 and into 2026, shifting from a relatively low-tension maritime environment to one increasingly shaped by the direct spillover of the Russia–Ukraine war.

What initially appeared as a mix of hybrid activity, sanctions enforcement, and electronic interference has developed into a sustained and multidimensional risk environment.

This brief assesses the emergence and evolution of GNSS interference activity in the vicinity of Port Sudan amid Sudan’s ongoing civil war.

Analysis of interference events between April 2023 and April 2026 shows a clear temporal and spatial correlation with key phases of the conflict, particularly RSF aerial and drone strikes, suggesting reactive use of electronic warfare as a countermeasure rather than persistent area denial.

Central Asia’s Middle Corridor has emerged as a strategic alternative linking China and Europe, strengthening supply chain resilience in the face of heightened geopolitical risk.

Sustained political engagement between European and Central Asian governments, alongside targeted investments along the corridor, demonstrates a clear systemic intent to position the route as a shock absorber for China–Europe trade.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a choke point in the global energy supply chain. Heightened threats have pushed exporters to rely increasingly on alternative routes and ports, including southern Gulf terminals, pipeline-linked outlets, and longer maritime detours.

These new routes face elevated security, operational and cost risks, disproportionately affecting countries most dependent on rerouted energy exports.

Tensions in the Taiwan Strait remain elevated as China continues to apply sustained “grey zone” pressure against Taiwan. These operations, which include large-scale military drills, air and naval incursions, missile exercises and coast guard patrols, are designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict. While commercial shipping has not been directly targeted, the operational environment is becoming increasingly complex.

Since 2022, China has normalised frequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activity around Taiwan. Joint air-sea exercises often simulate blockades or encirclement manoeuvres.

Hybrid threats are redefining the vulnerability of European land-based logistics by exploiting their interconnected, dual-use nature below the threshold of open conflict, as even small-scale, ambiguous acts of disruption can produce disproportionate operational and psychological effects.

This piece aims to shed light on how and why this evolution materialises, and to highlight that resilience, rapid recovery, and integrated coordination are vital for continuity in today’s landscape.

Although very common in maritime trade, bulk carriers are particularly vulnerable during crises, as demonstrated by attacks in the Black Sea and the Red Sea. Their slowness, poor manoeuvrability and long stopover times make them more vulnerable to strikes, hijackings or pirate attacks.

Although they are not major symbolic targets, unlike oil tankers or container ships, they remain popular for drug trafficking thanks to their many possible hiding places and the variety of ports they can serve.