Will there soon be a toll on the Strait of Hormuz?

Tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most important maritime trade routes. Source: Alamy

09 June 2026

Iran is seeking to impose a transit fee in the Strait of Hormuz, thereby challenging the principle of freedom of navigation, against the backdrop of a war launched on 28 February 2026 by the US and Israel. Taking advantage of deadlocks in negotiations, Tehran is adopting a delaying tactic based on maximalist demands to consolidate de facto control of the strait and legitimize a toll system. Historically aware of its geographical leverage, Iran is now transforming a posture of occasional threats into a long-term strategy, combining security pressure with the monetization of passage through the creation of the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA).

By Louis Borer, Senior Analyst

Iran’s intention to charge a transit fee in the Strait of Hormuz is reshuffling the cards when it comes to freedom of navigation at sea. Initially presented as a threat, four months after the start of the war launched by the US and Israel on 28 February 2026, the outlines of the plan appear to be taking shape.

Whilst the Trump administration is pushing for a swift agreement covering the nuclear deal and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is bringing maximalist demands to the table. Dominated by the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), negotiations between the US and Iran were suspended in early June, with Iran likely viewing the current status quo as a favorable situation, allowing it to legitimize its toll system and consolidate its de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Historically, Iran has always been aware of the power of its geography and its potential to cause disruption, dating back to the ‘Tanker war’ during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), or more recently, with the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. Since 2011, Tehran has periodically threatened to close the Strait. Now, this appears to be no longer merely a one-off pressure tactic, but the first step in a long-term strategy. The introduction of a toll mechanism would provide Iran with a significant source of revenue and a decisive lever of political influence.

Indeed, on 5 May 2026, the PGSA was established, becoming the ‘official’ point of contact for shipowners wishing to transit the strait. On 30 May, the IRGC headquarters declared that the management of this strategic strait was controlled “with full authority” by Iran; on 1 June, according to the IRGC, that more than 300 non-Iranian vessels had submitted information to obtain Iran’s authorization to transit the strait since late April. The PGSA has been directly sanctioned by the OFAC of the US Treasury, which warned shipowners and shipping companies in early May that any payment made to Iran could result in severe sanctions from OFAC. However, given the situation, the cost of insurance and the daily operating costs of a vessel, some shipowners have said they are willing to consider this option.

Although the geographical and geopolitical situations are very different, Iran is drawing inspiration from the model of the Bosphorus Strait, where Turkey exercises strict control over passage under the Montreux Convention. Regarding monetization, the other model put forward is that of the Suez Canal. Iran appears to be proposing the collection of similar ‘service fees’ to pay for Iranian services and navigation assistance in the strait – which had never been necessary before the war – via financial mechanisms outside the dollar-dominated system in order to circumvent sanctions.

If Iran succeeds in imposing this model, what would the potential consequences be? The Strait of Hormuz could set a precedent and inspire other states to follow suit, as was suggested by the Indonesian Finance Minister on 22 April regarding the Strait of Malacca, before he retracted those remarks. On a larger scale, this would call into question of freedom of transit passage and challenge the 1982 UNCLOS regime.

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