Hybrid threats and the strategic reframing of infrastructure

Illustration of an ROV operating beneath an offshore wind farm, symbolising hybrid threat monitoring and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. Created by Risk Intelligence.

24 July 2025

In today’s world we are returning to an international environment where hybrid threats and strategic competition are no longer historic or theoretical—they are shaping the threat landscape in real time. Offshore infrastructure, particularly wind farms and subsea cables, is increasingly exposed to a new class of threat: persistent, multi-domain, and deliberately ambiguous. As geopolitical friction intensifies—especially in maritime zones where NATO and Russian interests intersect—traditional security models are falling short. Operators must now adopt an intelligence-led posture, one that fuses physical resilience with strategic foresight and deterrence. The mindset must shift: from passive protection to active defence.

By Kristian Bischoff, Europe and Russia Analyst


Intelligence is the new baseline. Operators need to build threat intelligence capabilities that go beyond passive monitoring. This means integrating commercial satellite feeds, maritime data, government advisories, and industry threat monitoring systems like the Risk Intelligence System into a coherent picture. The objective isn’t just to observe vessel movements or drone activity—it’s to interpret intent. Maritime domain awareness must evolve to include real-time AIS analysis, pattern-of-life tracking, and the detection of spoofing or so-called shadow-fleet behaviour. At the same time, operators must establish strong, reciprocal relationships with national intelligence and military bodies. Threat information must flow both ways. This level of integration is essential for early warning—whether it’s seabed interference or coordinated cyber-physical probing.

Situational awareness must be multi-domain. Threats don’t respect boundaries between surface, air, and subsea. Surveillance systems must now be hybrid by design: radar and thermal optics for drone detection, sonar arrays and cable-integrated sensors for subsea activity, and satellite data for perimeter breaches. Smart cable technologies are already capable of detecting pressure changes, vibrations, or unauthorised ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicles) presence along critical links. AI-driven anomaly detection is no longer a luxury—it’s a necessity. It enables real-time decision-making and flags threats that would otherwise remain invisible until damage is done. Persistent awareness is a force multiplier, especially when response time is compressed.

Physical protection. Infrastructure must be physically and technically hardened to withstand deliberate interference. Subsea cables in high-risk corridors should be buried deeper and encased in protective sheathing. Interconnection points, substations, and turbines must be secured against intrusion and tampering. Asset design should prioritise redundancy, modularity, and rapid repair access. Control systems must be isolated from external networks and shielded against electromagnetic interference or signal disruption—both common features in hybrid operations. This is not just about resilience; it’s about survivability.

Strategic deterrence is often overlooked—but it’s critical. Operators must not only defend infrastructure—they must signal that it is defended. Wind farm operators and subsea infrastructure owners are by and large looked on as very easy targets. Publicising the presence of subsea surveillance systems, drone countermeasures, and rapid-response capabilities increases the perceived cost of action for adversaries. This signalling must be paired with policy advocacy. Operators should work with governments to ensure that attacks on energy infrastructure are clearly defined as national security incidents, with response frameworks under NATO or EU mandates. Legal clarity is a deterrent in itself. It removes the ambiguity that hybrid actors rely on.

Active defence can also be rolled into this. Making sabotage harder is one thing, but denying credible deniability is another. For example, drone surveillance of the seabed may be good for situational awareness, but UAVs can also be used to approach suspicious ships loitering above undersea infrastructure. Making it known that these vessels are being surveilled in real time may act as a major deterrent, the same way as floodlights can disrupt break-ins and similar activity on the ground.

Hybrid threats thrive in the grey zones—between peace and war, civil and military, cyber and physical. To protect critical infrastructure in this environment, operators must adopt a mindset that blends intelligence, engineering, and diplomacy. Every turbine, cable, and node must be treated not just as a technical asset, but as a strategic one.

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