Strategic Insights No. 23 published
14 April - New issue of Risk Intelligence's maritime security reports
The No. 23 issue has the following content:
Piracy and its suppression in the Strait of Malacca and Gulf of Aden: A critical comparison
Piracy in the Strait of Malacca and in the Gulf of Aden is often compared whereby assumptions are made that counter-piracy initiatives implemented in South East Asia could easily be mirrored off the Horn of Africa. Research Fellow for the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Stefan Eklöf Amirell, critically examines this theory by comparing the economic drivers and root causes in both regions to conclude that they are indeed very different areas requiring different prescriptions.
Illegal bunkering in Nigeria: A background and analysis
Illegal oil bunkering has become a common practice within Nigeria. It is not only a predominant criminal activity but the primary revenue stream for insurgent groups and criminal organisations. The consequence of illegal bunkering is a significant loss of revenue for the Nigerian state and fuels a culture of corruption throughout the various government and community branches. King’s College Research Associate Dr. Olawale Ismail examines the role that illegal bunkering plays in maritime security within Nigeria in this background analysis.
MaRisk feature analysis: Piracy in Indonesia, a declining threat?
It was not long ago when Indonesia was the global hotspot for piracy and armed sea robbery. Piracy, however, decreased significantly whilst incident reporting has increased considerably boosting transparency and suggesting a general improvement of security in Indonesia’s maritime domain. Associate Senior Analyst Dr. Guy Wilson Roberts examines the current activities and developments within the Indonesian archipelago in this issue’s MaRisk Feature Analysis.
Evaluating the ISPS Code amidst complex and evolving threats to maritime security (Part II)
It has been nearly six years since the implementation of the International Ship and Port Security Facility (ISPS) Code and the debate of its utility continues. Stowaway activities, narcotics and weapons trafficking, and various forms of armed sea robbery were initially targeted and declined after the implementation of ISPS. However, there is little evidence to suggest that ISPS measures are reducing stowaway movements and trafficking activities both within port facilities and at sea. Risk Intelligence Consultant, Rupert Herbert Burns examines these challenges with reference to the ISPS Code in a two-part series ending in this issue.
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