The conflict in Gaza: direct and indirect maritime and port impacts of the ballistic threat
An image of IDF Navy Sa'ar 6-class missile corvette. Source: IDF Spokesperson's Unit / CC BY-SA 3.0 / Wikimedia Commons
27 November 2023
The deteriorating regional geopolitical context since the Hamas attack on 7 October has highlighted the vulnerability of port facilities, offshore gas operations and shipping to ballistic threats from missiles, rockets, and drones. Israel, engaged in a complex conflict in Gaza, must protect itself from the artillery and ballistic threat of Hezbollah on its northern and north-eastern flanks, in the south with Hamas, and in the Red Sea from the Houthi ballistic threat that is targeting the Gulf of Aqaba area. Israel relies mainly on its Iron Dome system, and its naval version at sea, to counter this threat.
By Louis Borer, Senior analyst
In a regional context that has deteriorated since the Hamas attack on 7 October, the question of Israel's ability to protect itself against ballistic threats on land and at sea has once again arisen. The IDF (Israel Defense Force) relies mainly on its Iron Dome, a C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence system deployed in 2011 and developed by the Israeli Navy, Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Its principle is based on a network of 10 to 13 interconnected anti-missile batteries capable of covering an area of around 150 km2. While this system is considered to be one of the most effective in the world, it does have a number of shortcomings that could pose a potential threat to installations on land, in ports, and possibly at sea.
While the interception success rate is between 75 and 95%, the spectre of a saturating operation is the system's first weakness. Each battery consists of 3 or 4 missile launchers armed with 20 Tamir missiles. A massive launch of rockets, such as those observed on 7 October when almost 3,000 rockets were launched (and 7,000 more in mid-November), can saturate the system and reduce its interception rate. Iron Dome would also be ineffective against the threat of drones, which is why the IDF is developing the Iron Beam project, designed to destroy drones effectively.
The second limitation is financial. The unit cost of a Tamir interceptor is $50,000, compared with around $800 for a Hamas Qassam rocket. If Iron Dome only intercepts missiles or rockets deemed to be dangerous, the estimated arsenal of 100,000 Hezbollah rockets and missiles, and 30,000 for Hamas, would represent a financial cost that would be difficult for the IDF to sustain.
The question of the ballistic threat posed by Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis on the one hand, and the IDF's ability to deal with it on the other, arises notably for the main Israeli ports of Haifa, Ashdod, Ashkelon and Eilat, and offshore maritime activities. Although the attacks carried out by Hamas had a maritime dimension, they were essentially commando infiltration by sea, and the ports in the south of Israel were not a particular target for Hamas. In the north, several intercepts and missiles fired by Hezbollah targeted Haifa and the surrounding area. The city had already been targeted in 2006 during the Second Lebanon War, its port and refinery making it a strategic target. However, since October 2023, the exchanges of missile and artillery fire have been concentrated further east, around the Blue Line that demarcates the two countries, and Haifa appears to be well protected by the Iron Dome and the Israeli navy deployed in the area.
At sea, Hezbollah's ballistic targeting of the Israeli-operated Karish Field offshore gas field seems highly unlikely at this stage. Politically, any military action would immediately compromise the agreements of 27 October 2022, on which Lebanon, which is going through a serious economic crisis, remains dependent for the exploitation of the Qana gas site. Tactically, apart from a drone operation, precision ballistic targeting of such installations would be complex. The chances of success are all the more reduced with the deployment of the naval version of the Iron Dome, which now arms the IDF's Saar 6 corvettes, equipped with Tamir interceptors and Adir radar. The Saar 6's mission is mainly to protect strategic ports and Israeli interests in their EEZ.
The final front to consider is the Red Sea and the Houthi threat, one of the main Iranian proxies in the area. Since the Israeli ground operation in Gaza, the Houthis have promised to target Israeli interests in the Red Sea, a threat that was put into practice with the helicopter boarding of the GALAXY LEADER. But the Houthis also, and above all, have a wide range of rockets, unmanned boats and aircraft, and cruise and ballistic missiles, several of which were fired towards the Gulf of Aqaba, overflying the Red Sea. At least four missile interceptions were reported in the area by Risk Intelligence, including an impact near Eilat on 7 November. Most of these strikes were intercepted by the Iron Dome, the Israeli air force, or the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS THOMAS HUDNER on patrol in the Red Sea. On a tactical level, these shots do not represent a serious threat to Eilat or maritime activities in the Red Sea. In addition to the mobilisation of Israeli forces on the southern flank, if the Houthis become frustrated with the effectiveness of ballistic countermeasures, they might consider alternative means of attacking maritime targets.
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